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## ARE OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES DOCTORED?

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, Columnist Edith Kermit Roosevelt, writing in the July 19 Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin, has painted a graphic picture of the workings of our intelligence apparatus and raised a serious question as to the philosophical slanting of the intelligence reports upon which much of our national policy is based.

Miss Roosevelt quotes the very excellent and comprehensive interim report on Cuba, drafted last year by the subcommittee headed by my friend from Mississippi, Senator STENNIS:

Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it could be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba, resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous.

I believe related questions raised by Miss Roosevelt deserve the attention of the public, and I ask that her column be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the column was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### BETWEEN THE LINES: INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES "DOCTORED"?—PHILOSOPHICAL CONVICTIONS INJECTED INTO CUBAN REPORT

(By Edith Kermit Roosevelt)

WASHINGTON.—A government process which is practically unknown to all citizens is the system used to produce national intelligence estimates.

Estimates do not refer to budgetary matters but are supposed to be fully rounded appraisal of a situation, recommendations and possibilities. These estimates occupy a decisive position in formulating new policies or in justifying policies about to be implemented.

Indeed, a special group calling itself the Board of National Estimates exists within the Central Intelligence Agency specifically to compile and write national intelligence estimates. These estimates ultimately are concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) which operates within the National Security Council structure.

All other intelligence gathering agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Service Intelligence Agency, and the

FBI, have representation on the USIB. The National Intelligence Estimates which evolve in this manner are used by the President, the National Security Council, and the Department of State and the Defense Department as a basis for policy.

#### VITAL TO SURVIVAL

Understandably, our topmost Government officials are so involved in routine bureaucratic affairs that they rely more and more on these estimates to determine their own attitudes, approval or disapproval of the most crucial issues of national and international life, matters literally of our personal and collective survival and extinction.

Yet, often these estimates are drawn up according to preconceived theories or conclusions. Instead of reflecting hard intelligence facts, many of our national intelligence estimates reflect preconceived policies or justification for policies already implemented.

The tipoff that this is in fact the case is seen in the interim report on the Cuban military buildup, put out by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In its "summary of major findings," the report stated that: "Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous."

#### SCHEDULES FURNISHED

How do such philosophical convictions get injected into the determination of national intelligence estimates?

Estimates are usually based upon requests or schedules furnished by the State Department. The word "schedules" in this context does not refer to anything so crude as a railroad or time schedule. It is a capsule description of an assignment.

These "schedules" are actually a few paragraphs containing virtual instructions to the intelligence agencies that determine in advance what they are supposed to find. For example, let us take the following typical State Department schedule setting the direction on the Cuban military buildup.

"The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which could be used against the United States would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in United States-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. has displayed thus far, and would have important policy implications in

"However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture, and in that connection, the feasibility and utility of delivering nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this possibility must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to Soviet policy."

#### WEAKNESS OF SYSTEM

Understandably, when they are handed such a line from higher ups, most intelligence men will choose not to credit the "tales" by Cuban exiles or bestir themselves to find photographs supporting hard intelligence facts.

Another weakness in the system is that many times members of the USIB do not agree on certain points in the national intelligence estimates or even reject an "estimate" outright. This is known to have happened when the question of U.S. resumption of nuclear testing was at issue. The estimate paper, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "overplays the negative reaction of world opinion on the resumption of nuclear testing" by the United States. The Chiefs urged that "The 'estimate' should be rejected for policy use because it is one sided, misleading, and in large measure irrelevant."

Nevertheless, the estimate was implemented into policy at that time. Obviously, this could happen again and at a time when a Soviet breakthrough in weaponry could destroy millions of American lives.

#### WATCHDOG KENT

Such a system is used to neutralize or change a policy to conform with the thinking of certain elements, such as Sherman Kent, who heads the Board of National Estimates. Kent is known in the intelligence community as "a watchdog for the State Department." He was formerly head of the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence which engages in clandestine activities. He also served as Chief of the Europe-Africa Division of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Kent's file reveals that as far back as his OSS days (1941-45) the validity of his intelligence reports was questioned.

Nowadays, an official is not likely to do anything so obvious as "doctoring" reports. He just sees to it that unwanted intelligence simply is not gathered, or if it is, that it is ignored.

The perfect formula for diversion and paralysis of national policy—the formula actually set up by Alger Hiss—is exemplified in the national intelligence estimates system. In Asia and Latin America, we are its "successes."